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Summary 
We estimate the causal effect of immigrants' legal status on criminal behavior exploiting 
exogenous variation in migration restrictions across nationalities driven by the last round of 
the European Union enlargement. Unique individual-level data on a collective clemency bill 
enacted in Italy five months before the enlargement allow us to compare the post-release 
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pardoned inmates from candidate EU member countries. Difference-in-differences in the 
probability of re-arrest between the two groups before and after the enlargement show that 
obtaining legal status lowers the recidivism of economically motivated offenders, but only in 
areas that provide relatively better labor market opportunities to legal immigrants. We 
provide a search-theoretic model of criminal behavior that is consistent with these results. 
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We estimate the causal eect of immigrants' legal status on criminal behavior ex-
ploiting exogenous variation in migration restrictions across nationalities driven by
the last round of the European Union enlargement. Unique individual-level data on a
collective clemency bill enacted in Italy ve months before the enlargement allow us
to compare the post-release criminal record of inmates from new EU member coun-
tries with a control group of pardoned inmates from candidate EU member countries.
Dierence-in-dierences in the probability of re-arrest between the two groups before
and after the enlargement show that obtaining legal status lowers the recidivism of
economically motivated oenders, but only in areas that provide relatively better la-
bor market opportunities to legal immigrants. We provide a search-theoretic model
of criminal behavior that is consistent with these results.
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11 Introduction
Concerns about the eects of immigration on crime are widespread. As a matter of
fact, foreigners are heavily over-represented among the prison population of all developed
countries. In recent years the share of foreigners over ocial residents barely reached 10%
in the US (and it was signicantly lower in most other countries), while their incidence over
incarcerated individuals was many times larger (Figure 1). Such numbers increase support
for migration restrictions, which prevent part of the prospective immigrant population
from (legally) residing in the host countries. At the same time, if enforcement is loose,
migration restrictions might also create a pool of unauthorized immigrants that are able
to (illegally) cross the frontier but, once in the host country, do not enjoy legal status and
therefore cannot work in the ocial sector.
The implications of migration barriers for crime are then ambiguous. On the one hand,
restrictive policies prevent a number of immigrants (that would be potentially at risk of
committing crime) from entering the country, or expel them after entry; on the other hand,
those that manage to enter anyway face worse income opportunities in ocial markets,
which raises their propensity to engage in criminal activity. Empirically identifying the
overall eect is dicult as immigrants determine, at least in part, their legal status. The
decision about whether to reside legally or illegally into the destination country may in
fact respond to several individual characteristics (e.g. working ability) that are also likely
to enter the decision about whether to commit a crime. In addition to this problem, the
size of the illegal immigrant population is usually not reported in ocial statistics, so their
crime rate remains also unobserved.
In this paper we exploit exogenous variation in legal status, provided by the last round
of the European Union (EU) enlargement, and detailed criminal records on a sample of
pardoned immigrants in Italy to address these issues. After August 1, 2006, more than
9,000 foreigners were released from Italian prisons upon approval of a Collective Clemency
Bill passed by the Italian Parliament; ve months later, on January 1, 2007, about 800 of
them acquired the right to legally stay in Italy as their origin countries, namely Romania
and Bulgaria, entered the EU. We thus exploit the asymmetric eect of the EU enlargement
across nationalities to estimate the eect of legal status on criminal behavior, as measured
by the post-release criminal record of pardoned foreign individuals.
The empirical strategy is grounded on a search-theoretic model of crime that relates
legal status to the probability of committing a crime. In the tradition of economic models
of crime, agents choose between legitimate and illegitimate activities by comparing the
economic costs and benets between the two. Granting access to the ocial sector, legal
status raises the returns to legitimate activities (or the opportunity cost of illegitimate
ones), which in turn lowers the probability of engaging in crime. However, there is also
another eect that goes in the opposite direction. Immigrants without legal status may
in fact be deported back to their own country with some positive probability, which me-
chanically reduces the pool of individuals in this group that are at risk of committing an
2oense.
The model does also allow for self-selection into legal status. In particular, migration
policy imposes some xed cost on ocial entrants, so that only immigrants with higher
(legitimate) income opportunities in the host country will decide to comply with it; the
other ones prefer to enter unocially and face the risk of being expelled in the future.
Therefore, self-selection at the frontier implies that the distribution of individual char-
acteristics potentially correlated with criminal activity diers systematically between the
groups of legal and illegal immigrants; this will also be the main threat to the identication
of the causal eect of legal status.
To address this issue, we focus on the dierence-in-dierences in the probability of
(re)arrest between pardon inmates from new EU member countries and a control group of
inmates from candidate member countries, before and after the EU enlargement. While
there are signicant dierences between the average characteristics of the two groups,
weighting observations by the (inverse) propensity score of belonging to each group elim-
inates such dierences, as well as dierences in pre-enlargement outcomes. Baseline es-
timates suggest that the average probability of rearrest over a six-month period declines
from 5.8% to 2.3% for Romanians and Bulgarians after obtaining legal status (as a conse-
quence of the EU enlargement), relative to no change in the control group. Distinguishing
between dierent categories of potential oenders, the eect is signicant only for pardoned
inmates that were previously incarcerated for economically-motivated crimes and the re-
duction is stronger in areas characterized by better income opportunities for legal (relative
to illegal) immigrants. These results are robust to alternative estimation techniques and
to several robustness checks.
We contribute to the literature on social and economic eects of immigration. Until
very recently, this research area has traditionally emphasized the labor market competition
between immigrants and natives (surveys include Borjas, 1994; Friedberg and Hunt, 1995;
Bauer et al., 2000; Card, 2005), as well as the eects of immigration on scal balances
(Storesletten, 2000; Lee and Miller, 2000; Chojnicki et al., 2005) and prices (Lach, 2007;
Cortes, 2008). Drawing on survey evidence from 21 European countries in 2002, Card
et al. (2009) show that, besides these (\economic") issues, natives' support for migration
restrictions is shaped also (and indeed mostly) by other \compositional amenities", among
which crime plays a major role.1
Partly as a consequence of this increasing awareness, a few previous papers have ex-
amined the empirical relationship between immigration and crime. At the aggregate level,
Butcher and Piehl (1998a), Bianchi et al. (2008) and Bell et al. (2010) document some
correlation between- and within-local areas in the US, Italy and the UK, respectively,
but conclude that the causal eect is not dierent from zero (maybe with the exception
of asylum-seekers in the UK).2 At the micro level, Butcher and Piehl (1998b, 2007) use
1See also Bauer et al. (2000)
2Partly in contrast with these ndings, Borjas et al. (2010) argue that migration has indeed an eect,
but a very indirect one: by displacing black males from the labor market, immigration increases the
3Census data to show that, keeping other individual characteristics constant, current immi-
grants have lower incarceration rates than natives, while the opposite was true for former
immigrants at the beginning of the XX century (Moehling and Piehl, 2007). Yet, no pre-
vious study has investigated the role of legal status; this is precisely the contribution of
the present paper.
We also add to a huge empirical literature on the relationship between legitimate
income opportunities and criminal career. Indeed, the fact that the propensity to engage in
crime should decrease with outside options in ocial markets is one of the key results of the
economic model of crime (Becker, 1968). Over the years, several paper have examined the
empirical validity of this prediction, nding in general a good deal of evidence consistent
with it: a non-exhaustive list includes Witte (1980), Meyers (1983), Grogger (1998), Gould
et al. (2002) and Machin and Meghir (2004). We contribute to this strand of literature by
showing that, also in our sample of pardoned foreigners, access to better legitimate income
opportunities (through the acquisition of legal status) lowers the individual propensity to
engage in crime.
In the next section we summarize the main features of immigration in Italy, paying
particular attention to the gap between legal and illegal immigrants in terms of labor
market outcomes and crime. In Section 3 we provide a theoretical framework that captures
these elements in a very simple way, studies the channels through which legal status may
impact on crime and claries which are the main threats to identication. Then, Section 4
describes in detail the natural experiment while Section 5 derives the estimating equations.
Finally, in Section 6 we discuss the empirical results and Section 7 concludes.
2 Legal and illegal immigrants: preliminary evidence from
Italy
After centuries of massive emigration, Italy became a recipient of positive net in
ows
only in the late 1980s. As a consequence, the legislative framework in this respect is also
very recent, the rst migration law being enacted in 1990 and later amended in 1995
and 2002. Throughout these changes, Italian migration policy remained rmly grounded
on the institute of the residence permit, which establishes a direct link between working
condition and legal residence: the main condition for eligibility is receiving a job oer in
Italy. However, the total number of residence permits issued each year is xed on the basis
of migration quotas decided by the government.
2.1 Ocial migration
Over the last two decades, the number of valid residence permits rose from less than 1
million at the beginning of the 1990s to more than 2 million in 2005, slightly declining
thereafter; the number of foreign (ocial) residents increased even more steeply, from less
criminal activity of this latter group.
4than 600 thousands to almost 4 million (in the face of an otherwise declining population),
see Figure 2. Ocial residents include immigrants holding a valid residence permit (and
possibly their close relatives), as well as foreigners enjoying legal status in Italy for other
reasons, such as being citizen of a EU member country. The divergence between the
two measures (permits and residents) toward the end of the period is indeed explained
by the EU enlargement, which starting in 2004 relieved an increasing number of Eastern
European citizens from the need of a residence permit to legally reside in Italy.
Notwithstanding the spectacular growth of the ocial immigrant population, the num-
ber of newly issued residence permits fell systematically short of total demand over the
years, often by a large extent. For instance, 170,000 permits were issued in 2007 in front of
more than 740,000 demands; the following year, the number of new residence permits even
decreased to 150,000, to be primarily assigned to applications left pending the year before
(thus increasing the gap between current demand and supply of permits). In addition to
that, the 2002 reform of migration policy requires prospective immigrants to nd a job
contract before entering the country, thus hampering further the match of foreign workers
with Italian employers. Stringent requirements on permit eligibility and tight rationing
of migration quotas, coupled with weak border enforcement (also due to the geographic
conguration and location of the Italian peninsula), resulted in an increasing number of
undocumented immigrants illegally crossing the border or overstaying tourist visas.
2.2 Unocial migration
While the very nature of unocial migration prevents accurate estimates of its size,
amnesties of formerly undocumented immigrants provide some information in this re-
spect. During these episodes, immigrants illegally present in Italy can apply for a valid
residence permit under very mild conditions, with clear incentives to report their illegal
status.3 General amnesties have been enacted every 4-5 years since 1986, growing in size
from 100 to 200-250 thousand individuals during the 1990s, and reaching a peak of 700
thousand in 2002. The acceleration in ocial migration observed during the last few years
was thus accompanied by an analogous one in unocial in
ows; see Figure 3.
The graph reports also the number of illegal immigrants expelled from the country.
In Italy illegal immigrants apprehended by the police are not incarcerated. Rather, they
are accompanied at the frontier and deported back to their origin country. In some cases,
deportation is not enforced and the individual receives just an injunction to leave the
country.4 While the fraction of immigrants that are deported is not large, it isn't negligible.
Looking again at the years in which there was an amnesty, the ratio of expulsions over
3Bianchi et al. (2008) and Fasani (2009) also use applications for amnesty to estimate the size of the
illegal population in Italy, while several studies adopted the same methodology to count the number of
undocumented immigrants in the United States after the amnesty passed with the Immigration Reform
and Control Act in 1986 (see, e.g., Winegarden and Khor, 1991).
4In 2002 the last reform of migration policy (Law 189/2002) introduced the possibility of incarceration
for those that did not comply with a previous injunction to leave and were later re-apprehended by
the police. However, such norm was never enforced because it was deemed Anti-Constitutional by the
Constitutional Court.
5demands for amnesty by unocial immigrants were 17% in 1986, went up to 28% in 1998,
and down again to 15% during the last amnesty program of 2002.
2.3 Criminal and labor market outcomes
Even though foreigners cannot be incarcerated for breaking migration laws, they are nev-
ertheless overly represented in Italian prison population. The number of foreign inmates
more than doubled since the early 1990s, from less than 10 thousand to more than 20
thousand in 2008, in the face of just a slight increase of total prison population. As a
result, the share of foreigners in prison population has reached one third (Figure 4), an
order of magnitude greater than the share of immigrants in the whole population. Of
course, such imbalance is not necessarily driven by dierences in criminal behavior, as
it might also depend on statistical discrimination in law enforcement against foreigners
(Becker, 1957). Yet, it is hard to believe that such a huge dierence in incarceration rates
between natives and foreigners is the sole product of discrimination.
However, an important distinction between ocial and unocial immigrants seems to
suggest that discrimination is not the whole story. While detailed statistics on convicted
foreigners disaggregated by legal status are not publicly available, the Italian Ministry of
Internal Aairs (2007) claims that legal immigrants represented about 6% of all individ-
uals reported by the police to the judiciary authority in year 2006, which is in line with
their share over total population. The disproportionate incidence of foreigners in prison
population is entirely due to undocumented immigrants, who account for 70% and 80% of
foreigners reported for violent and property crimes, respectively.
Then, legal status seems to have profound implications for immigrants' criminal ca-
reers. There are several reasons why this might indeed be the case. In particular, legal
and illegal immigrants may face very dierent (legitimate) earning proles, which in turn
aect the opportunity cost of crime. Most likely, the administrative and penal sanctions
(including the possibility of incarceration) faced by employers who hire undocumented
immigrants, in addition to the risk of job destruction due to the expulsion of the worker,
adversely impact on the demand for illegal immigrants (relative to those holding a valid
residence permit). This eect could be amplied by selection into legal status. Far from
being randomly distributed, legal status is strongly correlated with other individual char-
acteristics, which are known to be important determinants of criminal activity.
While information in this respect is not available for a representative sample of (legal
and illegal) immigrants in Italy, survey evidence from a region in the North-West is con-
sistent with this conjecture. Starting in year 2001, the NGO ISMU has conducted yearly
interviews on a sample of about 9,000 immigrants in the Lombardy region. The data con-
tain information on labor market outcomes, along with several individual characteristics,
including legal status. Sampling of illegal immigrants is attained through the \center-
sampling technique" devised by the statistical team of ISMU in the early 1990s. The main
idea is to exploit the social networks among the foreign population and base sampling
6on a number of \aggregation centers" that are attended by both legal and unauthorized
immigrants (care centers, meeting points, shops, telephone centers, etc.), as opposed to
administrative sources that cover only ocial residents; the methodology is described at
length in Blangiardo et al. (2004) and Blangiardo (2008).5
Table 1 compares the characteristics of legal and illegal immigrants in the 2006 round
of the survey (that is, immediately before the EU enlargement of 2007). It turns out that
unauthorized immigrants are on average younger, less educated, disproportionately single
males and have fewer kids. Most importantly, they tend to be employed in occupations
with lower skill content and earn signicantly lower wages; notice also that the wage gap
is relatively more severe among the high-skilled.6
While restrictions imposed by migration laws on the employment of illegal immigrants
certainly explain part of the wage gap, the striking dierences in other observable charac-
teristics point at the importance of selection into legal status. In particular, immigrants
could voluntarily self-select when deciding whether to comply or not with migration pol-
icy; for instance, individuals with better income prospects in the host country could exert
greater eort in dealing with the bureaucratic diculties imposed by (legal) entry pro-
cedures. On the other hand, selection could also be involuntarily (on the part of the
immigrant), whenever less skilled individuals have lower chances to receive a job oer
eventually entitling them to apply for a permit. Whatever the reasons are, the dierences
reported in Table 1 suggest that legal status is not randomly distributed across immi-
grants, which considerably hampers the empirical identication of its eect on criminal
behavior.
We next present a model of crime that is consistent with the stylized facts described
above and claries which are the main threats to identify the causal eect of legal status
on crime.
3 Theoretical framework
Consider a population of innitely lived, risk-neutral prospective immigrants. If they
decide to actually move to the destination country they incur a travel cost T. In addition,
ocial entry in the host country imposes an upfront cost B on legal immigrants (L); such
cost may include, for instance, the time and money spent to deal with paperwork, acquire
health certications, pay head taxes and so on. Alternatively, immigrants may decide to
cross the border illegally. In this way, illegal immigrants (I) avoid the burden imposed by
migration policy, but face the risk of being apprehended and deported back to their home
5Using the ISMU data to estimate the determinants of immigrants' earnings in Italy, Accetturo and
Infante (2010) examine the reliability of the information on legal status by comparing the results of the
2002 survey with the demands for amnesty presented during the same year, concluding that the extent of
under-sampling of unauthorized immigrants and/or misreporting of legal status is modest.
6Drawing on several rounds of the ISMU survey, Accetturo and Infante (2010) conrm these ndings
in a multivariate regression analysis. Extensive empirical evidence on the wage gap suered by illegal
immigrants is available also for the US, see for instance Bratsberg et al. (2002), Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark
(2002) and Kaushal (2006).
7country at the beginning of any subsequent period.
Once in the host country, both legal and illegal immigrants may engage in crime.
Criminal activities deliver an immediate payo z, which is randomly distributed across
agents in each period according to the cumulative density F(z); however, those committing
a crime are arrested and sent to jail in the following period with probability . Assuming
a constant discount factor  < 1, the expected utility of seizing a crime opportunity z for
immigrants of type k = I;L is then
Ck(z) = z + [P + (1   )EVk] (1)
where P is utility associated with incarceration, Vk is the utility when not in prison and E
denotes expectations over (future) values of z; without loss of generality, we may impose
P equal to zero.
Apart from criminal proceeds, immigrants have access to labor earnings that vary with
individual skills and the returns to skills for dierent groups of immigrants in the labor
market. In particular, letting h denote the (heterogeneous) level of human capital, the
wage of each immigrant is wLh if (s)he holds a residence permit and wIh otherwise, with
w = wL   wI  0.7 While the strict inequality would be consistent with the empirical
evidence discussed in the previous section, the conservative assumption that wL is no lower
than wI is sucient for all the results that follow.
The utility of legal immigrants is
VL = maxfCL(z);EVLg + wLh; (2)
which depends both on the decision about criminal activity (the rst term on the r.h.s.)
and on legitimate income (the second term). The utility of illegal immigrants is similar
except for the fact that, with probability  > 0, they are apprehended and deported back
to their origin country,
VI = VH + (1   )[maxfCI(z);EVIg + wIh]; (3)
where VH is utility in the home country. The latter depends, positively, on the labor
market income wHh and we posit that wH < wI  wL.8 From now on we assume for
simplicity that those expelled from the country do not try anymore to migrate.
Individuals face three decisions: whether to migrate or not; in case they do, whether
7From now on the notation  will always refer to the dierence between the (potential) outcomes of
an individual when legal and illegal.
8Since in most cases human migration is an economic phenomenon, it seems natural to assume that
wages in the destination country are higher than in the origin country. In our formulation, this occurs
through higher returns to human capital, which might be at odds with standard factor proportion ex-
planations of migration. On the other hand, it is consistent with more recent models stressing the eect
of skill-biased technical change on labor market outcomes in destination countries, which aects in turn
the relative returns of more and less educated migrants (Acemoglu, 2002, provides a survey). Also, it
is consistent with extensive empirical evidence on the positive selection of immigrants; see Grogger and
Hanson (2010) for a recent study.
8to cross the border legally or illegally; nally, once in the host country, they must choose
whether to accept or reject the crime opportunities available in each period. The latter
problem is at the core of the economic model of crime rst proposed by Becker (1968),
in which individuals choose whether to engage or not in crime depending on the relative
return of legitimate and illegitimate activities.9 Admittedly, our framework is very stylized
in this respect, reducing such problem to a discrete choice between crime and lawfulness. In
this way, we prevent continuous time-allocation choices between legitimate and illegitimate
activities (Grogger, 1998), as well as ex-ante investments in human capital (Lochner, 2004).
However, these simplications are inconsequential for the empirical analysis, given that
our data do not contain such information. The present model captures the institutional
features of Italian migration policy that are common to most other countries, namely that
legal aliens face a substantial bureaucratic and economic burden upon entry and that
illegal aliens may be deported back to their origin country. We next describe in greater
detail the trade os involved in each decision and solve the problem backward, starting
from the choice about criminal activity.
3.1 Criminal behavior
In deciding whether to engage or not in criminal activity each individual of type k = I;L
compares the expected returns from criminal activity, Ck(z), with their opportunity cost,
EVk. Since Ck(z) depends, positively, on the value z of illicit income opportunities
available in each period (while EVk does not) there must exist a reservation value z
k
such that each individual of type k commits a crime if and only if z  z
k.10 Imposing
the expected payos from crime equal to its opportunity cost for both legal and illegal
immigrants, Ck(z
k) = EVk (k = I;L), and substituting into (1) delivers the reservation
values
z
k = EVk: (4)
Conditional on legal status, the reservation value completely characterizes criminal
behavior. In particular, the probability of committing a crime for legal immigrants simply
equals the probability of receiving a crime opportunity worth more than z
L,
cL = 1   F(z
L); (5)
for illegal immigrants, we must rst condition the probability of committing a crime on
the risk of deportation,
cI = (1   )[1   F(z
I)]: (6)
The log-probability of committing a crime for each individual, conditional on legal
9See also Ehrlich (1973), Grogger (1998) and Machin and Meghir (2004) for later developments; Burdett
et al. (2003), Lochner (2004) and Lee and McCrary (2009) provide extensions in dynamic settings that are
most similar to ours.
10Notice the analogy with the notion of \reservation wage" commonly adopted in equilibrium search
models of labor (see Rogerson et al., 2005, for a survey)
9status, may be written compactly as
lnc(h) = lncI(h) + (h)L;
where L = 1 if the immigrant is legal and L = 0 otherwise, and (h)  lnc(h) is the
causal eect of legal status conditional on h; using equations (5) and (6),
(h)     [F(z
L)   F(z
I)]: (7)
The sign of (7) depends on two eects. On the one hand, holding constant the propen-
sity to engage in criminal activity, deportation of illegal aliens (at rate ) lowers the number
of crimes they commit relative to legal immigrants. This is the incapacitation eect of
migration restrictions, which is apparent from the rst term on the right hand side, mov-
ing the crime rate upward after the removal of migration restrictions. On the other hand,
the propensity to criminal behavior does also change with legal status, because dierent
labor market opportunities for legal and illegal immigrants entail also a dierence in terms
of opportunity cost of crime. This second eect, which is apparent from the last term of
the equation (namely the change in the probability of accepting a crime opportunity for
formerly unocial immigrants) increases with the wage premium to legal status, w  0.
However, its sign and strength, as well as the direction of the overall eect in (7), depend
crucially on the equilibrium distribution of h across legal and illegal immigrants, which
we examine next.
3.2 Equilibrium
In the remainder of this section we provide a graphical representation of the equilibrium
and the intuition behind all results; formal proofs are presented in the Appendix. First
notice that wH < wI implies that there exists a threshold for h above which individuals
decide to leave the origin country. In particular, Figure 5a shows that all individuals
characterized by h  hI prefer to unocially cross the border rather than staying home.
What about the option of entering the destination country by complying with migra-
tion policy? Notice that, once in the host country, all immigrants prefer to be legal rather
than illegal, i.e. EV = E(VL   VI) > 0. By a simple revealed-preference argument, in
fact, all those willing to (illegally) migrate prefer to live in the destination than in the
origin country; therefore, these same individuals are better o avoiding the risk of being
deported back. Moreover, the dierential EV increases with h; intuitively, better la-
bor market opportunities in the destination country mean a greater utility loss in case of
expulsion.11
After arrival, legal immigrants are thus better o holding a valid residence permit;
however, upon arrival, they must bear the entry cost B, so they apply for legal status
if and only if EV  B. Since EV (h) is upward sloped, the latter condition must
11The Appendix presents the formal proof that EV  0 and
@EV
@h  0 for h  hI.
10hold beyond some threshold hL; see Figure 5b. The diagram clearly illustrates the self
selection of immigrants at the frontier: individuals in the upper tail of the distribution of
skills comply with migration policy, while those in the intermediate range [hI;hL] enter
unocially in the country.
Therefore, labor skills sort out immigrants from non-immigrants and, among the for-
mer, legal from illegal entrants. Figure 5c shows then how the equilibrium distribution of
h determines within- and between-group dierences in criminal behavior. The probabil-
ity of committing a crime for legal immigrants, cL, is inversely related to the reservation
value z
L, which in turn is proportional to expected utility EVL; the same is true for illegal
immigrants, conditional on not being deported. Therefore, EVL(h) > EVI(h) implies that,
conditional on h, unauthorized immigrants that are not deported commit more crimes than
legal immigrants: ~ cI = 1   F(z
I)  1   F(z
L) = cL. However, the unocial population
includes also those that are deported at the beginning of each period (before committing
a crime), so deportation shifts the crime rate for this group down from ~ cI to cI.
The causal eect of legal status on crime is then the average (log) dierence between
the curves cL and cI over the interval [hI;hL]
  E [(h)jhI  h  hL] = E [lncL(h)jhI  h  hL]   E [lncI(h)jhI  h  hL]: (8)
The sign of (8) is a priori ambiguous, depending upon whether the average (relative)
reduction in criminal activity by formerly unocial immigrants after the concession of
legal status, E [(F(z
L)   F(z
I))jhI  h  hL], is strong enough to counterbalance the
increase in crime brought by the end of deportations. Therefore, determining the eect of
legal status on criminal activity is ultimately an empirical issue.
3.3 Identication
Assuming to have data on criminal activity for a sample of legal and illegal immigrants,
the main threat to empirically identify  is that each individual is commonly observed only
in one state (either with or without legal status), so the rst term on the right hand side of
equation (8), namely the (counterfactual) log probability of committing a crime for illegal
immigrants conditional on obtaining legal status, is not observed (in the terminology of
Rubin, 1974, it is the \potential outcome"). Missing this element, one could alternatively
conduct a naive comparison between legal and illegal immigrants,
~  = E [lncL(h)jhL  h]   E [lncI(h)jhI  h  hL];
however, E [lncL(h)jhL  h]  E [lncL(h)jhI  h  hL] (because crime decreases with h),
so ~  would provide a downward biased estimate of ,




11see the last diagram in Figure 5.
The last round of the EU enlargement provides an exogenous source of variation in
legal status that allows us to remove the selection bias. The next section describes in
detail this quasi-experimental setting.
4 The natural experiment
4.1 The EU enlargement
With the fall of the Eastern Bloc and the EU enlargement toward the east, immigrants
from central and eastern Europe became a large and growing share of total in
ows in Italy
(see Figure 2). A rst round of the enlargement took place in 2004 with the admission
of Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia
and Slovakia. Then, on January 1st, 2007, Bulgaria and Romania also joined the EU; and
the process of enlargement is far from over, as several countries are \candidate members" of
the EU. In particular, Croatia, Turkey and the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia
are already negotiating admission conditions, while such negotiations should start soon
for Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia. New member and
candidate member countries are shown in Figure 6.
Article 39 of the European Commission Treaty would in principle allow citizens of new
member countries to i) look for a job in any other country within the EU, ii) work there
without needing any permit, iii) live there for that purpose, iv) stay until the end of the
employment relationship, v) enjoy equal treatment with natives in access to employment,
working conditions and all other social and tax advantages that may help to integrate in
the host country. In practice, however, several countries in Europe maintained signicant
restrictions to the free movement of immigrants from new member countries.
The application of the EU directives was at the center of a heated public debate also
in Italy until the very last weeks before the enlargement, mostly because of the alleged
impacts on crime. However, in the end (on December 28, 2006) the center-left government
led by Romano Prodi guaranteed free movement to all new EU citizens and completely
liberalized access to the labor market in the following sectors: agriculture, hotel and
tourism, managerial and highly skilled work, domestic work, care services, construction,
engineering and seasonal work. These sectors account for the bulk of foreign employment,
both before and after the enlargement. And in the rest of the ocial economy (basically
the manufacturing sector) migration quotas were also eased in order to accommodate the
larger number of workers from Romania and Bulgaria.
The removal of migration restrictions led to sharp changes in the composition of for-
eign population in Italy. The left graph of Figure 7 compares the number of (ocial)
residents coming from new member and candidate member countries before and after the
EU enlargement. Until 2006, the combined size of Romanian and Bulgarian communities
was about half of the other group, the dierence between the two remaining constant over
12the period. Then, in the wake of admission to the EU, the number of Romanians and
Bulgarians ocially residing in Italy nearly doubled, while the size of the other group
continued to grow at approximately the same rate as in the previous years.
A similar pattern arises among the individuals arrested by the Italian police between
2006 and 2007. However, the (dierential) increase was much less pronounced in this
case, so the ratio of arrested over total ocial residents actually declined for Romanians
and Bulgarians, while no signicant change is observed for the control group; see the
right graph in Figure 7. At a rst sight, one might be tempted to conclude that the
removal of migration restrictions favored a decline in criminal activity. Yet, the increase
in Romanians and Bulgarians between 2006 and 2007 includes both in
ows from abroad
and acquisitions of legal status by (formerly unocial) immigrants already in Italy, the two
components being undistinguishable from each other. Figure 7 would be indeed consistent
with a decline in the crime rate if the sharp increase in the left graph was driven largely by
in
ows of new immigrants after the EU enlargement. On the other hand, if it was caused
by changes in legal status of foreigners already residing in Italy before 2007, the decline
in the incidence of arrests would be due to the fact that formerly unocial immigrants
impact, positively, on total ocial population only after 2007, but aect the number of
crimes both before and after that period.
One way to circumvent this problem is to focus on a sample of immigrants that were
already present in Italy before the enlargement.
4.2 The July 2006 Collective Pardon
Italian collective pardons eliminate part of the sentence, typically 2 or 3 years, to all prison
inmates; then, all those whose residual sentence is below such length are immediately
released. In this way, pardons generate sudden releases of large numbers of inmates. The
only ones excluded are Maa members, terrorists, kidnappers, and sexual oenders, but
even violent criminals like murderers and robbers can be pardoned. Whenever a pardoned
prisoner recommits a crime within ve years, the commuted prison term gets added to the
new term.
Collective clemency bills are deeply rooted in Italian history; over the last 40 years
there has been on average a pardon every 5 years (Barbarino and Mastrobuoni, 2010).
The last one was voted by the Italian Parliament in July 2006 and enacted shortly after
(on August 1). About 22,000 individuals, corresponding to more than one third of total
prison population, were freed within a few days. More than 8,000 of them were foreigners,
reaching the gure of 9,642 by the end of 2006.
We were granted access to the criminal records, from August 2006 through December
2007, of all prison inmates released with the Collective Clemency Bill.12 The most im-
portant information for our purposes is the nationality and the date of rearrest (if any).
12These data are similar to those used by Drago et al. (2009) to study the deterrence eect of residual
sentence.
13Figure 8 shows that, among foreigners, a large number of pardoned inmates were rear-
rested over the following year and a half. In particular, 795 individuals were back to jail by
the end of 2006, before the EU enlargement, growing to 1654 one year later, after the EU
enlargement. The main idea behind our empirical strategy will be then to exploit dier-
ences in the probability of rearrest, before and after the EU enlargement, across dierent
nationalities in our sample.13
5 Empirical strategy
In this section we devise a dierence-in-dierences estimator that exploits the unique
characteristics of our sample to estimate the eect of legal status on the probability of
committing a crime. If legal status does indeed aect the criminal behavior of immigrants,
we should observe a change in such probability for Romanians and Bulgarians after the
EU enlargement. In terms of our theoretical model, the average log probability for this
group in year 2006 (before the policy change) is
E [lnc(h)] = E [lncI(h)jhI  h < hL]G(hL) + E [lncL(h)jhL  h][1   G(hL)]; (9)
where G(:) is the cumulative density of h among the immigrant population in the host












Subtracting (9) from (10) delivers the change after the extension of legal status to all





= G(hL) + 	; (11)
where 	 is the (unobserved) counterfactual change between the two periods absent the
policy shock,
	 = E [lnc0
I(h)   lncI(h)jhI  h < hL]G(hL)
+E [lnc0
L(h)   lncL(h)jhL  h][1   G(hL)]: (12)
Equation (11) claries which are the main estimating issues, which we examine next.
13While looking at former prisoners may at a rst sight limit the external validity of our results, it
allows indeed to focus on the group of individuals that is at the margin between a criminal career and
legitimate activity; at the opposite, the great majority of the population at large never engages in any type
of (serious) crime. For this and other reasons, previous oenders have been widely studied in the empirical
literature on crime, see for instance Witte (1980) and Lee and McCrary (2009).
14Letting  (h) denote the cumulative distribution of h over the entire population in the origin country
(including migrants and non-migrants), G(h) = 0 for h  hI and G(h) =
 (h)  (hI)
1  (hI) for h > hI.
145.1 The control group
To isolate any causal eect  from common trends and time-specic shocks in 	, we rely
on a control group that is as close as possible to Romanians and Bulgarians except for
the change in legal status between 2006 and 2007. Pardoned inmates from candidate EU
member countries naturally provide such a control group.
As we described in the previous section, in fact, candidate members are countries
that have either started access negotiations or that are going to do so in the near future.
Therefore, this group of countries should be most comparable to new EU members along
the economic and political criteria required for admission to the EU. As a matter of
fact, they all belong to the same geographical area and most of them (possibly with the
exception of Turkey) share a great deal of linguistic, cultural and historical heritage.
Our sample includes about 800 Romanians and Bulgarians, as well as 1,800 immigrants
from candidate member countries; restricting to the subsample of males (in order to reduce
heterogeneity), we are left with 725 and 1,622 individuals, respectively. Using the change
in crime for the the control group between 2006 and 2007 to estimate the right hand side











where the subscript 0 denotes the control group.
Equation (13) will constitute the basis for our empirical analysis. Moving to its sample
analogue requires to address some important measurement issues.
5.2 Measurement
The rst issue concerns the measurement of criminal activity, which remains partly un-
observed. This happens either because of under-reporting of criminal oenses or because,
even for the recorded ones, the identity of the oender cannot always be determined. One
observes incarceration, though, which is often used as a proxy for unobserved criminal
activity (see, e.g. Ehrlich, 1996; Levitt, 1996). Consistently with this approach, our model
maintains that the probability of being arrested after a crime is constant and equal to




cI(h). It follows that the relative log probability of incar-
ceration for legal and illegal immigrants is exactly equal to the relative log probability of
committing a crime, which remains unobserved; since the former is instead observable, we
will use it as our main dependent variable. The confounding eect of departures from this
assumption will be discussed as we present the empirical results.
The second measurement issue concerns the term G(hL), namely the fraction of illegal
immigrants in (prison) population. Since illegal status is not by itself a valid reason
for incarceration, administrative criminal records do not report the legal status of the
individuals in our sample. Nevertheless, a valid estimator for the right hand side of
equation (13) would still be informative about the sign of  and would bound its magnitude
15from below. Moreover, as we already point out in Section 2, the fraction of illegals is very
high (between 70% and 80%) among the foreign prison population, so the attenuation bias
induced by G(h) < 1 is going to be small.
5.3 Propensity score weighting
Longitudinal data on (re)arrests of former inmates from new EU member countries and
candidate member countries over the period 2006 and 2007 allow us to estimate equation
(13) using the dierence-in-dierence between the log probability of arrest for the two
groups before and after the EU enlargement. The identifying assumption is that in the
absence of the policy shock the hazard rates for the two groups would have followed
parallel paths. Such condition may be implausible in presence of signicant dierences
in individual characteristics that are possibly correlated with criminal activity (Abadie,
2005).
The left columns of Table 2 compare the two groups in terms of the observable charac-
teristics that are reported in our data, namely age, gender, marital status and education,
the latter being available only for a very restricted subsample; the type of crime for which
the individual was rst incarcerated before the Pardon (possibly more than one, so the
group means of economic and violent crimes do not add up to one); nally, the length of
sentence and the amount commuted with the pardon.15 While marital status is not signif-
icantly dierent, Romanians and Bulgarians appear to be on average younger (31 vs. 33
years of age) and more educated than individuals in the control group; they are also more
(less) likely to commit violent (economic) crimes but, despite this, they are charged to
lighter sentences. One reason may be that migration waves from such countries are more
recent, while immigrants from some countries in the control group (primarily Albanians)
came earlier in time and are more likely to have recidivated.
If we are willing to assume that deviations from the \parallel paths" depend solely on
dierences in observable characteristics, conditioning on such dierences does remove all
biases. This assumption, which is alternatively referred to as unconfoundedness, condi-
tional independence, selection on observables or ignorability of treatment, constitutes an
important special case in the econometrics of program evaluation (Imbens and Wooldridge,
2009). While unconfoundedness may be a strict requirement, notice that we are imposing
it on changes over time of the crime rate (as opposed to levels); that is, we allow for
(time-invariant) dierences between groups to persist even after conditioning on observ-
able characteristics. Moreover, the availability of longitudinal data over repeated periods
before the policy change provides us with the opportunity to investigate the plausibility
of unconfoundedness.
One simple way of adjusting for dierences between the two groups is to weight ob-
servations based on the propensity score of assignment, i.e. the conditional probability of
15The data report also the prison from which the individual was released (167 institutes in total), which
will be used later in the analysis.









where new EUi is a dummy equal to 1 if the i-th individual is citizen of new EU member
countries and 0 otherwise, p is the unconditional probability of belonging to the new EU
group and P(Xi) is the same probability conditional on the vector of individual charac-
teristics Xi.
The weighting scheme (14) enhances the comparability between the two groups by
attaching greater (lower) weight to units that are less (more) dierent from the other
group relative to the average individual in the sample.17 As it is generally the case in
non-experimental settings, the propensity score is unknown, so we estimate it exploiting
all information available in our data set. In practice, we compute the predicted propensity
score based on a logit regression of an indicator variable for being Romanian or Bulgarian
on the following vector of covariates: a quadratic polynomial in age, marriage status, edu-
cation (indicator variables for illiteracy, primary and secondary school, as well as missing
information on education), type of crime committed when rst incarcerated (7 categories),
a quadratic polynomial in sentence and commuted sentence and, nally, a full set of xed
eects for the region where the prison from which the individual was released is located.18
Figure 9 shows the distribution of the estimated propensity score by group. As it should
be expected, there is a large tail of individuals in the control group whose estimated
propensity score is close to zero, meaning they are very dierent (in terms of observable
characteristics) from Romanians and Bulgarians. Then, the weighting scheme will dis-
count these observations, while it will attach greater importance to observations of both
groups that lie in the middle range of the distribution. The right columns of Table 2 show
that weighting observations according to (14) actually eliminates dierences in average
group characteristics. We next examine to which extent this adds to the credibility of un-
confoundedness by investigating pre-enlargement dierences in outcomes, which depend
on both observable and unobservable characteristics.
5.4 Preliminary evidence
Figure 10 plots non-parametric estimates of daily log hazard rates of re-arrest of inmates
from new EU member (solid line) and candidate member countries (dashed line).19 Since
16Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that, under unconfoundedness, conditioning on the propensity
score and on the full set of covariates are equivalent methods of guaranteeing independence of potential
outcomes across groups. One advantage of using the propensity score is that it reduces the dimensionality
of the conditioning problem (from a multi-dimensional vector to a scalar).
17The idea of using the propensity score to weight observation was pioneered by Hirano et al. (2003);
Abadie (2005) extends the same approach to dierence-in-dierences estimators.
18We dropped a few observations for which some covariates other than schooling were missing.
19The hazard rate is the probability of being rearrested at each period-at-risk  conditional on not having
been rearrested in the    1 periods before. For the sake of graphical illustration, we restrict to inmates
release during the rst week after the Pardon (about 72% of total sample), so the duration-at-risk on the
horizontal axis is the same for all individuals. The results presented in the next tables will be based instead
17we are particularly interested into the eect of legal status through legitimate earning
opportunities, we focus on individuals that were rst arrested (before the pardon) for
economically-motivated crimes (mainly property and drug-related oenses).
The left graph shows the results obtained before applying the weighting scheme. While
Romanians and Bulgarians display greater recidivism during the rst months after the
pardon, the opposite is true after they obtain legal status. Turning to the plausibility
of identifying assumptions, the evidence from the pre-enlargement period seems broadly
consistent with the hypothesis of parallel outcomes (absent the policy change). As we
weight observations by the propensity score (right graph), not only the dynamics but also
the levels of the hazard rates are very similar between the two groups, which provides
strong empirical support for unconfoundedness of changes over time across groups. Turn-
ing to the eect of legal status, a few weeks before the EU enlargement, the probability of
incarceration starts to decrease for Romanians and Bulgarians, continuing to do so during
the rst months of 2007.
To quantify such eect, in Table 3 we cross-tabulate the hazard rate of re-arrest for
each group over the last two trimesters of 2006 and the rst two of 2007, as well as the
dierence between the two groups in each period and the dierence-in-dierences across
dierent periods. The left panel of the Table shows the results for economically-motivated
oenders. The second row conrms that, after weighting by the propensity score, the two
groups exhibit an identical probability of incarceration before the policy change. Then, in
2007 the hazard rate does not change signicantly for the control group while it decreases,
from 5.8% to 2.3%, for Romanians and Bulgarians; as a result, the dierence-in-dierences
is also negative and very similar in absolute value (3.2%). Instead, the eect is positive
and smaller in magnitude for violent oenders.20
The table does also report both robust and bootstrapped standard errors. While
bootstrapping will generally lead to valid standard errors and condence intervals for
propensity score weighting estimators (Abadie and Imbens, 2008), Busso et al. (2009)
suggest that robust regression standard errors provide a good approximation as the number
of observations grows large. This is conrmed in our case, as the two estimates of the
standard errors are always extremely similar. For the sake of computational eciency,
inference on the multivariate regression models presented next will be based on robust
(clustered) standard errors.
Turning to inference, the eect of the EU enlargement on the recidivism of economically-
motivated oenders from new EU member countries is statistically signicant at con-
ventional condence levels, while the dierences for violent crimes are not signicantly
dierent from zero.
on the total sample.
20Notice that, when we focus on violent oenders, we restrict to individuals that were previously in prison
for having committed only violent crimes. Instead, individuals that were reported for both economic and
violent crimes are included among economically-motivated oenders, in that the latter type of crime was
probably instrumental to the rst one (e.g. an assault during a robbery).
185.5 Parametric and semi-parametric models
To probe these results further, in the next section we t parametric and semi-parametric
models for the probability of rearrest at each point in time. Specically, the parametric






= new EUi + postt + new EUi  postt + x0
i
 + t; (15)
where cit is the probability of observing the arrest of individual i at time t; new EUi
and postt are xed eects for the group of new EU member countries' citizens and the
period after the EU enlargement, respectively; xi is a vector of individual characteristics
reported in our dataset and t is a polynomial in (calendar) time. Therefore, in this setting
postt captures any discontinuous change in the log-odds of rearrest between 2006 and 2007
(besides the smooth trend t), while  is the average dierential eect for Romanians and
Bulgarians after the EU enlargement.
To condition the probability of rearrest on not having being rearrested before, we follow
Efron (1988) and estimate equation (15) on the weekly (unbalanced) panel of inmates that
are at risk of rearrest during each period. Therefore, the cross section of observations for
the rst week includes all individuals released immediately after the pardon; the second
week includes all those released until then and not rearrested in the rst week, and so
on. In this way we end up with 124,019 person-week observations for the subsample of
economically-motivated oenders.21
An alternative approach is to model directly the hazard rate (as opposed to the prob-
ability) of rearrest,




where it is the probability of being rearrested in period t given that the individual has not
been rearrested during the  periods-at-risk before. Therefore, this class of models allows
to disentangle the eect of calendar time shocks (i.e. the EU enlargement) from that of
time-at-risk (which varies across individuals depending on the exact moment at which they
were released). Equation (16) is the general form of proportional hazard models, which
dier from each other with respect to the specication of the baseline hazard function
0
. The most 
exible approach is to leave it unrestricted and estimate the coecients
of interest by partial maximum likelihood (Cox, 1972). Therefore, the semi-parametric
model trades o eciency for 
exibility relative to the fully parametric approach.
21Lee and McCrary (2009) do also adopt this strategy to estimate the probability of re-incarceration,
while Ashenfelter and Card (2002) apply the same methodology to study retirement choices.
196 Results
In this section we present our estimates of equations (15) and (16), along with several
robustness exercises and specication tests. Observations are weighted by the (inverse)
propensity score, as described in the previous section, and standard errors are clustered
by Italian region and country of origin to allow for within-network correlation in criminal
activity (immigrants' network being dened on the basis of nationality and geographic
proximity in Italy).
6.1 Baseline estimates
Table 4 reports the estimated coecients and standard errors for the subsample of economically-
motivated oenders. The rst columns show the results for the fully parametric model
(15). Column (1) includes only group- and year-specic xed eects besides the interac-
tion between the two; in column (2) and (3) we add a quadratic time trend and the vector
of individual controls reported in our data, respectively; in column (4) we adopt the most

exible parametric specication by controlling for a full set of weekly dummies. In line
with the preliminary evidence in the previous section, the estimated coecient of the
interaction variable is negative and signicantly dierent from 0 (at the 95% condence
level). As of its magnitude, a decrease in the log-odds of 73-74% (very stable through all
specications) is also in line with the (unconditional) change in the probability of rearrest
reported in Table 3 (from 0.058 to 0.023). The coecient changes only slightly when we
move to the semi-parametric Cox model, in the last two columns of the table. Notice also
that the group xed eect new EU is always close to zero and non-statistically signicant,
further strengthening the credibility of the main identifying assumption.22
In Table 5 we report the results for violent oenders. Inference is much less precise
in this case, because the sample size is much smaller.23 Still, the point estimates are
again consistent with the preliminary evidence in Table 3, namely that violent crime
increases after the policy change. Therefore, the end of expulsion after the EU enlargement
might have determined an increase in the number of crimes committed by this category
of oenders, which might be less (or not at all) responsive to economic motives when
engaging in criminal activity. Instead, access to legitimate income opportunities seems
strong enough to move the crime rate in the opposite direction for the subsample of
economically-motivated oenders. We next explore this mechanism in detail.
6.2 The role of labor market opportunities
In our theoretical framework, the overall eect of legal status depends on two opposite
forces: on the one hand, the end of deportations of formerly unocial immigrants (and
22As of the other explanatory variables, the residual sentence plays a deterrence role, in line with the
results of Drago et al. (2009); marriage status has also a signicant eect.
23For the same reason, we do not estimate the unrestricted specication, including the full set of week-
specic xed eects, for the subsample of violent oenders.
20some potential criminals among them) increases the number of crimes they commit in
the host country; on the other hand, access to legitimate income opportunities raises the
opportunity cost of crime. We next confront these predictions with the data, exploiting
variation in the relative importance of these factors across dierent regions in Italy.
Specically, the Italian Statistical Oce (ISTAT) assigns 8 regions each to North and
South, and 4 to the Center; if we aggregate Center regions to the South, we obtain an area
that is comparable to the North in terms of number of observations in our sample, but
profoundly dierent in terms of economic and social development. As shown in Table 6,
the North is in fact characterized by higher income and better labor market opportunities
in the ocial sector. Actually, 6 out of 10 regions in Center-South fall into the \Objective
1" areas according to the EU classication (meaning among other things that their GDP
per capita falls below the 75 percent of the EU average). At the same time, a large share
of the labor force in the Center-South resorts to employment in the unocial sector; the
relative size of the shadow economy is twice as much as in the North (last column of the
table).24
The relative importance of the ocial and unocial sector determines in turn the
income opportunities of legal and illegal immigrants, respectively. Therefore, we should
expect the increase in the opportunity cost of crime after obtaining legal status to be
greater in the North.
On the other hand, North and Center-South exhibit similar levels of enforcement of
migration restrictions. In particular, if we estimate the number of illegal immigrants based
on the applications presented during the last amnesty program (as previously explained
in Section 2.2), we obtain similar ratios of unocial over ocial immigrants in the two
areas; see the bottom panel of the table. Therefore, the change in the probability of
deportation for Romanians and Bulgarians after the EU enlargement should have been of
similar magnitude between North and Center-South.
In the end, if we compare the policy eect in the North relative to that in the Center-
South we are keeping approximately constant the change in incapacitation while increasing
the strength of the economic channel; see also Figure 11. If the eect of legal status goes
through the mechanism proposed in our theoretical framework, the magnitude of the
(negative) change in the criminal activity of Romanians and Bulgarians should then be
greater in the North.
This is exactly the evidence emerging from Tables 7 and 8. The unconditional change
in the fraction of Romanians and Bulgarians rearrested in the North between 2006 and
2007, as well as the dierence-in-dierences relative to the control group, are almost twice
as much as the average eect in the whole country; at the opposite, no signicant (dier-
ential) eect is detected in the Center-South. These results are qualitatively unaected
by conditioning on common time trends and individual characteristics in the parametric
and semi-parametric models.
24Indeed, the dierential between North and Southern Italy has been widely studied over the years, see
for instance Eckaus (1961) and Helliwell and Putnam (1995).
216.3 Structural break point
The estimates presented so far detect a statistically signicant decrease in the criminal
activity of immigrants from new EU member countries relative to the control group after
the EU enlargement. Moreover, variation across areas characterized by dierent rela-
tive income opportunities for legal and illegal immigrants is consistent with the channel
proposed in our theoretical framework.
One question is whether such estimates are really capturing the eect of this policy
change as opposed to other events aecting the relative hazard rate of the two groups
before and/or after that moment. In order to exclude this possibility, we run a placebo
experiment at any possible date in our sample period to identify the most likely break
point in the behavior of the two groups, much in the spirit of the tests of Andrews (1993)
for identifying structural changes with unknown break points. If the most likely period is
close to (distant from) the date of the EU enlargement, this would be evidence against (in
favor of) spurious eects driving the results.
In practice, for each placebo date t we estimate the following linear probability models
on the sample of individuals at risk of incarceration in each period t  t and t > t,
H0 : d
it = new EUi + post
t (17)
H1 : d
it = new EUi + post
t + new EUi  post
t;
where post
t = 1 after t and post
t = 0 otherwise, and d
it = 1 if individual i was re-arrested
in period t and d
it = 0 otherwise; notice that estimating  by OLS is an alternative way of
calculating the dierence-in-dierences reported in Table 3. Then, for any possible break
point t we compute the R-squared ratio between models H1 and H0, as a measure of the
importance (in terms of explanatory power) of any dierential change in criminal behavior
between the two groups at date t.
The placebo estimated coecients and R-squared ratio for Italy, as well as for the North
and Center-South areas, are presented in the the left plots in Figure 12. The most likely
break point for Italy as a whole is December 12, which is indeed quite close to the date of
the enlargement and consistent with immigrants rationally anticipating the policy change
and modifying their behavior as uncertainty about the policy change gradually unravels
(see Section 4.1).25 When the same test is run separately for North and Center-South,
the estimated break-points are very similar (December 1 and December 7), but while for
the North the additional explanatory power is considerable, for the Center-South the R-
squared increases by just a little; moreover, in the latter case the dierence-in-dierences
eect is positive. This might be explained by the absence of signicant improvements of
the income opportunities of formerly unocial immigrants after obtaining legal status, so
that in Center-Southern regions the incapacitation eect prevails also for economically-
motivated oenders. Another thing to notice is that the magnitude of the eect (gray
25A likelihood ratio test statistic based on Cox's proportional hazard model gives very similar results.
See Ichino and Riphahn (2005) for a similar exercise.
22line) is always higher as we let the data \choose" the break point, rather than xing it on
January 1, 2007.
The right plots in the gure provide additional visual evidence in this respect, showing
the discontinuity in criminal behavior at the estimated break point. The plots are predicted
(daily) hazard rates of rearrest as a function of a third order polynomial in time for
Romanians and Bulgarians (solid line) and for control group (dashed line), before and
after the break point. In line with the results in Tables 7 and 8, the discontinuity for
the rst group is particularly relevant in Northern regions, reaching 8%, as opposed to no
discontinuity at all for the control group.
One interpretation of the general increase in the magnitudes is that estimating the
break point addresses the measurement error induced by the fact that individuals will not
in general stick to the ocial date of the policy change when adjusting their behavior. On
the other hand, when we choose the break point by maximizing the explanatory power of
the dierence-in-dierences, specication search bias implies that the coecient estimated
using the same data will have a nonstandard distribution (Leamer, 1978); in particular,
conventional test statistics reject too often the null hypothesis that the coecient is equal
to zero. For this reason, we stick to the (more conservative) estimates reported in the
regression tables.26
6.4 Threats to identication
In the nal part of this section we discuss some additional identication issues. One rst
concern is that legal status aects the probability of being arrested and/or incarcerated
conditional on having committed an oense. For instance, immigrants found without
documents may be carefully scrutinized and additional evidence may become available at
closer inspection. Also, conditional on the severity of charges, ocial immigrants could
have easier access to sanctions alternative to institutionalization (like for instance home
detention). If this is the case, the reduction in incarceration that we observe could be ex-
plained by changes in the probability of ending up in jail conditional on criminal behavior,
as opposed to changes in criminal behavior itself.
While we cannot directly address this issue (because the conditional probability of
incarceration remains unobserved), there are several reasons why we believe that it is
possible to exclude these alternative stories on the basis of the available empirical evidence.
First of all, changes in the probability of arrest and incarceration should matter after the
EU enlargement, while all the tests identify the break point before that date, which is
more consistent with expectation-induced changes in (criminal) behavior. In addition,
there is little or no reason for these alternative explanations to impact dierentially in
26In a study on the dynamics of segregation, Card et al. (2008) address this source of bias by randomly
splitting the sample and using dierent subsamples to estimate the break point and the size of the change.
However, their data set includes about 40,000 census tract observations from 114 Metropolitan Areas,
so even after splitting the sample into 2/3 and 1/3 subsamples for estimating the break point and the
coecient, respectively, they end up with a reasonably large number of observations in both steps. On the
other hand, with just over 2000 individuals, we run into serious troubles in terms of statistical power.
23Northern and Center-Southern regions, or among economic and violent oenders. Finally,
as to the possibility of sanctions alternative to incarceration, the pardon status precludes
all individuals in our sample from accessing this opportunity.
Another issue is that legal and illegal immigrants may be characterized by a dierent
willingness to travel back to their origin country, as they retain the right to return to Italy
at any subsequent moment. While we consider at risk all individuals released with the
pardon, spending less time in Italy would decrease the probability of committing a crime
there for Romanians and Bulgarian after the acquisition of legal status. While this would
also imply a reduction in the crime rate of this group, the mechanism would be totally
dierent from the one proposed in this paper. However, also this alternative channel
(like the ones discussed before) should work mostly after the policy change and, again, it
should impact similarly on all (regardless of the type of crime previously committed and
the region of residence in Italy).
A related concern is that, after obtaining the right to free movement, immigrants might
consider moving to other European countries that oer relatively better labor market
opportunities to legal immigrants. In addition to the usual counter-arguments in terms of
break point and heterogeneity of eects (which hold true also in this case) we should notice
in addition that migration to other EU states would not occur instantaneously; indeed, if
this was really driving the change in re-incarceration, the eect should be increasing over
time, as more and more Romanians and Bulgarians exit from the pool at risk. Therefore,
we can investigate the empirical relevance of this alternative explanation by looking at the
evolution of the dierential eect over time. For this reason, we re-estimate the model
(15) truncating the longitudinal dimension at each week after the EU enlargement. The
results, shown in Figure 13, are remarkable stable over time, suggesting if anything that
most of the action takes place in the rst weeks after the enlargement, when migration to
other countries plays probably little or no role.
One nal issue concerns the possibility of interactions in crime between dierent com-
munities of immigrants. In particular, the change in the criminal behavior of Romanians
and Bulgarians after the EU enlargement could have aected the activities of the other
individuals in our sample, thus \contaminating" the control group. In particular, substi-
tution between the criminal activity of the two groups would bias our estimates upward,
in that other immigrants would increase their criminal activity in response to the decrease
by Romanians and Bulgarians; the opposite is true in the case of complementarity.
While interactions in crime raise formidable estimating issues (which we do not address
in this paper), descriptive evidence seems supportive of the complementarity hypothesis.
Figure 14 plots the change (between 2006 and 2007) in the number of crimes committed by
all Romanians in Italy against the same changes for (some of) the nationalities included in
the control group, for dierent types of crime.27 It emerges clearly a positive correlation
between the two. While we can hardly attach any causal interpretation to this nding,
27These data are not available for Bulgarians and some other small foreign communities in the control
group.
24the latter seems more consistent with the existence of complementarity in the criminal
activities of the two groups (as opposed to substitution), in which case our estimates
would be biased downward.
7 Conclusions
We use a natural experiment, namely the last round of the EU enlargement, to identify
the eect of legal status on immigrants' crime. We provide a theoretical framework that
illustrates the two main eects of legal status: on the one hand, it increases crime by
precluding deportation of potential foreign criminals; on the other hand, it lowers the
propensity to engage in crime by providing immigrants with better income opportunities.
Evidence from a sample of former prison inmates released in Italy a few months before
the enlargement suggests that the second eect prevails. In particular, the probability of
rearrest decreases by more than half after obtaining legal status as a consequence of the
EU enlargement.
Besides the eect on the pool of undocumented immigrants already in the host country,
the concession of legal status (either through subsequent rounds of the EU enlargement or
though amnesties) is also likely to attract new immigrants from abroad: indeed, thousands
of Romanians and Bulgarians were standing along the European borders on New Year's
Eve of 2007. It is then likely that changes in migration policy aect also the quantitative
dimension of incoming 
ows, as well as their composition. Policy makers would also need
an estimate of the cost and benets of these additional consequences, but this goes beyond
the scope of this paper.
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29Appendix
In this Appendix we characterize the expected utility functions EVL and EVI dened in
section 3, as well as the dierence between the two, EV = E (VL   VI).
Starting with EVL, we may subtract EVL from both sides of equation 2 to obtain
VL   EVL = maxfCL(z)   EVL;0g + wLh:
Taking expectations with respect to z and recalling that z
k = EVk (from equation 4)
delivers






after integrating by parts,




[1   F(z)]dz + wLh; (18)
In a similar way, one obtains that the expected utility of illegal immigrants may be written
as




[1   F(z)]dz + wIh
#
: (19)
Proof that EV (h)  0 8h  hI. By contradiction: assume that 9h0  hI such that








[1   F(z)]dz + wIh
#
(20)
Since [VH   EVI] < 0 over h  hI and w  0, a necessary condition for (20) to hold is
that z
L   z
I = z > 0 > EV ; but z and EV having a dierent sign contradicts
condition (4).
Proof that @EV
@h  0. Using again equation (4), @EV
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@h  0 is that z = EV  0,
which is always true over the interval h  hI.








NLD GRC BEL AUT USA (fed.) ITA DEU ESP PRT FIN
% foreigners over prison population % foreigners over total (official) population
Note: The gure shows the incidence of foreigners over prison and total population, respectively,
in some OECD countries around year 2000. The source is the OECD for all countries other than
the US. The data for the US are taken from Stana (2005) and refer exclusively to federal prisons;
representative data on state and local jails are not publicly available.






















































































































































































































































net inflows (x 1000 inhab.) residence permits
permits, central and eastern europe official residents
Note: The gure shows net migration in
ows in Italy, as well as foreign ocial residents and valid
residence permits during the period 1971-2007. Source: ISTAT and Ministry of Interiors.




































































































































































amnesties, applications for regularization residence permits deportations
Note: The gure shows the number of valid residence permits (since 1971), applications for regular-
ization of formerly unocial immigrants during the amnesty programs (1986, 1990, 1995, 1998, 2002)
and the number of deportations of undocumented immigrants over the period 1984-2006. Source:
Ministry of interior.


































































% foreign over total prison population (right axis)
foreign inmates
total prison population
Note: The gure plots the number of native and foreign prison inmates in Italy during the period
1992-2008, as well as the incidence of foreigners over total prison population. Source: Ministry of
Justice.
34Figure 5: theoretical model
 
Figure 5a: illegal immigrants 
 
 
Figure 5c: criminal behavior 
 
Figure 5b: self selection into legal status 
 
 










lncI = ln[1 – F(zI*)]
illegals, δ=0
(no enforcement)

















35Figure 6: new EU member and candidate member countries
Note: The map shows the countries admitted to the EU during the last round of the enlargement (in
black), as well as the group of candidate member countries (in gray). Source: European Commission.
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2006q1 2006q2 2006q3 2006q4 2007q1 2007q2 2007q3 2007q4
Romanians & Bulgarians EU candidates (Albania & Serbia-Mont)
people reported by the police, x 100k residents
Note: The left graph plots the number of citizens of new EU member and candidate member countries
ocially residing in Italy during the period 2002-2008. The right graph shows instead the ratio of
arrested by the police over ocial residents in each quarter during the period 2006-2007. In both
graphs the vertical line refers to the date of the last EU enlargement. Source: ISTAT and Ministry
of Interior.

















































Note: The gure plots the number of foreign prison inmates released after the Collective Clemency
Bill in August 2006 (on the left axis), as well as those rearrested until December 2007 (right axis).
The vertical line refers to the moment of the EU enlargement. Source: Ministry of Justice.
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propensity score
new EU members control group
Note: The gure shows the kernel density of the estimated propensity score across groups. The
propensity score is the probability of belonging to the groups of citizens of new EU member countries,
conditional on observable characteristics. The estimate is based on a logit regression of a dummy
for being Romanian and Bulgarian on a 
exible specication of the individual information included
in our sample.
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Pardon (08/2006) EU enlargement (01/2007)
Romanians and Bulgarians control
PS weighting
 
Note: The gure plots the non-parametric (Nelson-Aalen) estimates of daily log hazard rates of rearrest between
between August 2006 and May 2007 for Romanians and Bulgarians (solid line) and for the control group (dashed
line). The scale on the vertical axis reports the (estimated) hazard rate of rearrest in each day. In the right graph
observations are weighted by the (estimated) propensity score according to formula (14).









Note: The left map shows the ratio of legal over total (legal and illegal) immigrants across Italian
regions; the right map shows instead the relative size of the unocial economy. In both cases darker
colors refer to higher values. Source: ISTAT and Ministry of Interior.


























































































































































Note: The left graphs plot (black line and left axis) the ratio of the R2 of the dierence-in-dierences model H1 in
(17), estimated at each possible date in the sample period, over the R2 of the restricted model H0. The estimated
coecient of the interaction term in H1 is also shown (gray line and right axis). The vertical solid line corresponds
to the day that maximized the R2-ratio (i.e. the most likely break point), while the vertical dashed line is the
ocial date of the EU enlargement. The right graphs plot instead the predicted (daily) hazard rates of rearrest as
a function of a third order polynomial in time for Romanians and Bulgarians (solid line) and for the control group
(dashed line), before and after the break point.
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truncation of the sample (n-th week in 2007)
point estimate confidence interval
Note: The graph plots the estimated  in model (15), namely the dierence-in-dierences between
the log-odds of rearrest for Romanians and Bulgarians relative to the control group, before and after
the EU enlargement, when the longitudinal dimension of the sample is truncated at each week during
year 2007.
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Percentage change in crimes 2006-2007, Romanians
Note: The gure plots the (percentage) change between 2006 and 2007 in the number of Romanians
arrested in Italy for dierent types of crime against the same change for citizens of candidate member
countries. The area of markers is proportional to the total number of oenses committed in each
category. Source: Ministry of Interior.
41Table 1: legal and illegal immigrants, individual characteristics and labor market outcomes
variable illegals legals di.
obs mean obs mean
age 1280 31.29 7343 34.63 -3.34
(8.94) (9.36) (0.28)
female 1281 0.39 7353 0.44 -0.05
(0.49) (0.50) (0.01)
married 1281 0.34 7353 0.59 -0.26
(0.47) (0.49) (0.01)
number of kids 1279 0.76 7339 1.18 -0.41
(1.19) (1.28) (0.04)
college 1281 0.14 7353 0.16 -0.02
(0.34) (0.37) (0.01)
low skilled 1281 0.12 7353 0.09 0.04
(0.33) (0.28) (0.01)
income (euros per month) 949 824 5339 1130 -306
(371) (652) (22)
college premium 949 9 5339 112 -103
(35) (25) (62)
Note: This table reports the average characteristics of legal and illegal immigrants, as well
as the between-group dierence in each variable. The source is the 2006 round of the ISMU
survey, the sample is representative of the entire immigrant population of the Italian region of
Lombardy. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ,  and  denote between-
group dierences that are statistically signicant at the 90% condence, 95% condence and
99% condence, respectively.
42Table 2: sample statistics by group
NON-WEIGHTED SAMPLE PROPENSITY SCORE WEIGHTING
new EU control di new EU control di
obs mean obs mean mean obs mean obs mean Mean
age 725 31.083 1622 33.269 -2.187 700 33.335 1493 32.716 0.619
(7.597) (8.088) (0.355) (8.528) (7.914) (0.38)
low education 725 0.339 1622 0.461 -0.122 700 0.437 1495 0.422 0.015
(0.474) (0.499) (0.022) (0.496) (0.494) (0.023)
no education 725 0.017 1622 0.017 -0.0001 700 0.015 1493 0.018 -0.003
(0.128) (0.128) (0.006) (0.122) (0.133) (0.006)
education missing 725 0.539 1622 0.404 0.135 700 0.437 1493 0.450 -0.013
(0.499) (0.491) (0.022) (0.496) (0.498) (0.024)
married 725 0.257 1622 0.288 -0.031 700 0.266 1493 0.277 -0.011
(0.437) (0.453) (0.02) (0.442) (0.448) (0.021)
economic crimes 725 0.84 1622 0.894 -0.054 700 0.857 1493 0.877 -0.02
(0.367) (0.308) (0.015) (0.35) (0.328) (0.016)
violent crimes 725 0.295 1622 0.242 0.053 700 0.284 1493 0.262 0.022
(0.456) (0.428) (0.02) (0.451) (0.44) (0.021)
sentence (months) 725 20.31 1622 39.183 -18.873 700 32.115 1493 33.269 -1.154
(20.706) (32.33) (1.306) (30.63) (30.593) (1.435)
residual sentence 725 9.305 1622 15.727 -6.423 700 13.349 1493 13.83 -0.481
(10.615) (14.784) (0.609) (12.917) (14.13) (0.646)
Note: This table compares the characteristics of Romanians and Bulgarians in our sample with the group of citizens
from candidate EU member countries. The rst tree columns report non-weighted averages for each group, as
well as the between-group dierence for each variable. In the last three columns observations are weighted by the
inverse propensity score, according to (14). Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ,  and 
denote between-group dierences that are statistically signicant at the 90% condence, 95% condence and 99%
condence, respectively.
Table 3: dierence in dierence
economic crimes non-economic crimes
new EU control di. new EU control di.
0.023 0.054 -0.031 0.047 0.034 0.013
post (0.005) (0.008) (0.010) (0.020) (0.014) (0.025)
[0.006] [0.008] [0.010] [0.021] [0.014] [0.025]
0.058 0.057 0.001 0.033 0.043 -0.009
pre (0.013) (0.007) (0.015) (0.028) (0.021) (0.035)
[0.014] [0.008] [0.015] [0.019] [0.022] [0.029]
-0.035 -0.003 -0.032 0.014 -0.009 0.023
di. (0.014) (0.011) (0.017) (0.034) (0.025) ([0.043])
[0.014] [0.011] [0.018] [0.028] [0.027] [0.039]
Note: This table reports the fraction of individuals in our sample that are re-incarcerated,
distinguishing between citizens of new EU member countries and candidate member coun-
tries, as well as between the period before (\pre") and after (\post") the EU enlargement; the
dierence-in-dierences is reported in the South-East corner of the table. The left and right
panel show the cross tabulation for the subsamples of former inmates that were previously
incarcerated (before the pardon) for economic and violent crimes, respectively. Observations
are weighted by the inverse propensity score according to (14). Robust standard errors are
reported in parenthesis. ,  and  denote between-group dierences that are statistically
signicant at the 90% condence, 95% condence and 99% condence, respectively. Boot-
strapped standard errors, based on 400 replications, are also reported in square brackets.
43Table 4: economic crimes, parametric and semiparametric estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Logistic regression Cox model
new EU 0.091 0.091 0.071 0.073 0.022 0.002
(0.219) (0.220) (0.222) (0.222) (0.218) (0.219)
post -0.404 -0.162 -0.162 -0.249 -0.277
(0.167) (0.354) (0.354) (0.363) (0.364)
new EU  post -0.744 -0.740 -0.733 -0.736 -0.679 -0.668





age 0.090 0.090 0.088
(0.058) (0.058) (0.059)
age2 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
married -0.381 -0.380 -0.283
(0.176) (0.176) (0.158)
residual sentence -0.020 -0.020 -0.021
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
Observations 124019 124019 124019 115428 3547 3547
Subjects 1918 1918 1918 1918 1918 1918
Week dummies NO NO NO YES . .
pseudo R2 0.009 0.010 0.016 0.042 0.003 0.009
Log Likelihood -1704 -1702 -1691 -1631 -1797 -1786
Note: The table shows the results of parametric and semiparametric estimates of the probability of incarceration
for immigrants from new EU member and candidate member countries before and after the EU enlargement.
The parametric model in columns (1)-(4) is a logit equation for the log-odds or incarceration estimated on a
panel of individual-weeks observations; the panel is unbalanced because we include only the individuals that are
at risk of rearrest in any given week. The semiparametric model in columns (5)-(6) is a proportional hazard
Cox model for the log hazard rate of incarceration. The sample includes all inmates from new EU member and
candidate member countries released after the July 2006 collective pardon that were previously incarcerated for
having committed an economically-motivated oense. The dummy postt is equal to 1 in the weeks after the
EU enlargement (January 1, 2007), while time and time2 are linear and quadratic trends in time, respectively.
Regressions are weighted by the inverse propensity score according to (14). Robust standard errors clustered by
Italian region and country of origin are reported in parenthesis. ,  and  denote coecients signicantly
dierent from zero at the 90% condence, 95% condence and 99% condence, respectively.
44Table 5: non-economic crimes, parametric and semiparametric estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Logistic regression Cox model
new EU -0.281 -0.283 -0.222 -0.276 -0.215
(1.030) (1.030) (0.998) (0.691) (0.691)
post -0.546 0.044 0.051 0.490 0.493
(0.585) (0.999) (1.005) (0.838) (0.845)
new EU  post 0.251 0.251 0.245 0.256 0.243











residual sentence -0.008 -0.007
(0.023) (0.020)
Observations 18105 18105 18105 531 531
Subjects 272 272 272 272 272
pseudo R2 0.004 0.008 0.015 0.002 0.012
Log Likelihood -202.9 -202.1 -200.6 -150.2 -148.6
Note: The table shows the results of parametric and semiparametric estimates of
the probability of incarceration for immigrants from new EU member and candidate
member countries before and after the EU enlargement. The parametric model in
columns (1)-(3) is a logit equation for the log-odds or incarceration estimated on a
panel of individual-weeks observations; the panel is unbalanced because we include
only the individuals that are at risk of rearrest in any given week. The semiparametric
model in columns (4)-(5) is a proportional hazard Cox model for the log hazard rate of
incarceration. The sample includes all inmates from new EU member and candidate
member countries released after the July 2006 collective pardon that were previously
incarcerated for having committed (only) violent oenses. The dummy postt is equal
to 1 in the weeks after the EU enlargement (January 1, 2007), while time and time2
are linear and quadratic trends in time, respectively. Regressions are weighted by
the inverse propensity score according to (14). Robust standard errors clustered by
Italian region and country of origin are reported in parenthesis. ,  and  denote
coecients signicantly dierent from zero at the 90% condence, 95% condence
and 99% condence, respectively.
45Table 6: dierences between northern and southern Italy
North Center-South North/CSouth
Total sample 1244 1103 1.1
New EU 348 377 0.9
Candidate countries 896 726 1.2
economic structure (labor mkt opportunities)
GDP per capita 30066 20947 1.4
shadow economy (%GDP) 9% 18% 0.5
employment rate 48% 37% 1.3
illegal condition in 2002 (incapacitation)
residence permits, ths. 832 616 1.4
illegals (applications for amnesty), ths. 366 336 1.1
illegals/permits 31% 35% 0.9
Note: The table displays the average characteristics of Northern and Center-Southern regions, as well as the ratio
between the two (in the third column). Source: ISTAT and Ministry of Interior.
Table 7: North vs. South, dierence-in-dierences
northern regions southern regions
new EU control di. new EU control di.
post 0.014 0.061 -0.046 0.034 0.046 -0.013
(0.006) (0.010) (0.012) (0.009) (0.013) (0.016)
pre 0.066 0.053 0.013 0.049 0.063 -0.014
(0.020) (0.009) (0.022) (0.017) (0.012) (0.021)
di. -0.052 0.007 -0.059 -0.015 -0.017 0.001
(0.021) (0.014) (0.025) (0.020) (0.017) (0.026)
Note: This table reports the fraction of individuals in our sample that are re-incarcerated,
distinguishing between citizens of new EU member countries and candidate member coun-
tries, as well as between the period before (\pre") and after (\post") the EU enlargement;
the dierence-in-dierences is reported in the South-East corner of the table. The left and
right panel show the cross tabulation for the subsamples of former inmates that were released
from a prison in the North and Center-South of Italy, respectively. Observations are weighted
by the inverse propensity score according to (14). Robust standard errors are reported in
parenthesis. ,  and  denote between-group dierences that are statistically signicant
at the 90% condence, 95% condence and 99% condence, respectively.
46Table 8: North vs. South, parametric and semiparametric estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Northern regions Center-southern regions
Logistic Cox model Logistic Cox model
new EU 0.226 0.246 0.214 0.234 -0.085 -0.123 -0.224 -0.256
(0.254) (0.246) (0.287) (0.287) (0.355) (0.351) (0.339) (0.340)
post 0.168 0.170 -0.277 -0.343 -0.612 -0.612 -0.142 -0.612
(0.432) (0.432) (0.477) (0.478) (0.524) (0.524) (0.560) (0.524)
new EU  post -0.948 -0.933 -0.940 -0.923 -0.459 -0.465 -0.323 -0.331
(0.413) (0.422) (0.407) (0.408) (0.348) (0.347) (0.472) (0.472)
age 0.151 0.151 0.028 0.022
(0.083) (0.085) (0.086) (0.081)
age2 -0.002 -0.002 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
married -0.605 -0.599 -0.087 0.117
(0.195) (0.217) (0.315) (0.231)
residual sentence -0.022 -0.022 -0.019 -0.022
(0.009) (0.007) (0.010) (0.009)
Observations 68151 68151 1982 1982 55868 55868 1566 1566
Time trend quad. quad. 
ex. 
ex. quad. quad. 
ex. 
ex.
pseudo R2 0.011 0.021 0.005 0.015 0.011 0.015 0.003 0.009
Log Likelihood -989.9 -979.9 -950.9 -941.0 -710.4 -706.9 -679.6 -675.7
Note: The table shows the results of parametric and semiparametric estimates of the probability of incarceration
for immigrants from new EU member and candidate member countries before and after the EU enlargement,
distinguishing between Northern and Center-Southern regions. The parametric model (columns 1-2 and 5-6) is a
logit equation for the log-odds or incarceration estimated on a panel of individual-weeks observations; the panel is
unbalanced because we include only the individuals that are at risk of rearrest in any given week. The semiparametric
model (columns 3-4 and 7-8) is a proportional hazard Cox model for the log hazard rate of incarceration. The sample
includes all inmates from new EU member and candidate member countries released after the July 2006 collective
pardon from a prison in the North (columns 1-4) and in the Center-South (columns 5-8). The dummy postt is equal
to 1 in the weeks after the EU enlargement (January 1, 2007), while time and time2 are linear and quadratic trends
in time, respectively. Regressions are weighted by the inverse propensity score according to (14). Robust standard
errors clustered by Italian region and country of origin are reported in parenthesis. ,  and  denote coecients
signicantly dierent from zero at the 90% condence, 95% condence and 99% condence, respectively.
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